Recommended Reading, Part II: Anthrophysiocracy

The Post-Physicalist Physiocratic Curriculum, Continued

In “Why Has Our World Gone So Crazy?” I argued that “like every prior civilization, transnational progressivism is wrong about virtually everything. Actually, it’s worse than that. It’s even more wrong than some prior civilizations.” I backed up the claim with a list of categories where I thought the contemporary consensus had, indeed, gone very wrong. For each category, I offered a very short list of books that had been formative or influential on my view.

Ever since then, a number of readers have emailed me to ask for a longer list of recommended reading — one went so far as to ask for “a post-physicalist physiocratic curriculum.” In this series, I am attempting to provide such a curriculum.

As with my prior recommendations, the curriculum or reading list or whatnot will be divided into topical categories. Within each category, the books will be intended to serve as a framework, not a smorgasbord. That is, each category is meant to be read in toto, and no single book in each category should be taken as definitive. The inclusion of a particular book does not mean I endorse all, or even any, aspects of the writer’s conclusions; some books raise important questions, but answer them incorrectly; later books in the reading list provide the answers I hold.

As might be expected from a person with as many.. idiosyncratic… views as I hold, the books I recommend will often fall outside of the contemporary canon. Few will be primary sources; most of them are what I would call “books about other books” — that is, books written to summarize a body of knowledge or to offer a reaction to the perceived failures of such a body.

The physiocratic curriculum began with moral philosophy. In last week’s essay, I presented a series of books which persuaded me that Aristotelian meta-ethics, which seek to explain how to live a good life, are the correct meta-ethical framework for physiocracy. I ended with a discussion of how human morality carried both an objective and subjective component, analogous to the way that human diet has both nutrition and taste. Now we will turn to what I have dubbed anthrophysiocracy.

Physiocracy, of course, refers to “rule of nature.” The 18th century physiocrats adopted this moniker because they believed there was a "natural order" that made it possible for human beings to live together. Rejecting the idea of an arbitrary "social contract," the physiocrats sought to discover the laws of the natural order that would permit men to benefit from a harmonious society without sacrificing their personal freedoms.

In contrast, anthrophysiocracy refers to “rule of human nature.” It entails that the proper order of society is determined in part by the essential nature of the human species. Ants, bees, wolves, and men are all governed by Nature or Nature’s God, but the political society that is proper to each species is distinct. Famed entomologist E. O. Wilson made an anthrophysiocratic jest when he quipped “Karl Marx was right that socialism works, it’s just that he had the wrong species.”

Anthrophysiocracy, as I define it, asks us to consider whether the dictates of human nature mean that there are objectively better and objectively worse social structures for human flourishing.

But then it goes a step further.

If, as Wilson asserts, the biological differences between ant and man make communism good for the former and bad for the latter; then surely we must also consider whether biological differences between different human populations might make some systems good for one group and bad for another? If so, then the globalist agenda of a universalizing world order where everyone lives according to the same laws, structures, and principles is doomed to fail.

We will begin our exploration of anthrophysiocracy with Thomas Sowell’s masterpiece, A Conflict of Visions. Conflict has converted more people from left wing to right wing than any other book I know, including Atlas Shrugged. Most notably, both actor Adam Baldwin and playwright David Mamet cited A Conflict of Visions as the book that made them abandon leftism.

The core premise of Conflict is that Left and Right are not mere labels assigned to arbitrarily or contextually selected political beliefs, but rather are logical outcome of the eponymous “conflict” between the unconstrained and constrained view of human nature.

The unconstrained view sees human nature as infinitely malleable and inherently good. Any social problems are therefore attributed to the imperfections of social institutions, not to flaws in human nature itself. Those holding the unconstrained view believe that with the right guidance, education, or social structures, people can be made better and social problems can be solved. This vision relies on the belief that reason and moral improvement can lead to ideal solutions. Political and social systems based on the unconstrained view often emphasize equality of outcomes, social justice, and the reduction of hierarchies.

In contrast, the constrained view takes a more skeptical stance on human nature, seeing it as inherently limited, self-interested, and flawed. This perspective suggests that social problems stem from these unchangeable aspects of human nature. Therefore, the best that can be done is to create institutions and systems that channel these natural tendencies toward productive outcomes. The constrained vision emphasizes the importance of tradition, rule of law, and institutions that limit and disperse power. It prioritizes economic and personal freedoms, with a focus on processes rather than outcomes.

Sowell argues that these conflicting visions underpin all of our major political, economic, and social debates. The unconstrained vision aligns more closely with liberal or progressive ideologies, advocating for active intervention and reform to address societal issues. The constrained vision, on the other hand, aligns more closely with conservative or libertarian ideologies, stressing the importance of maintaining order, sublimating vice, and demanding individual responsibility.

Sowell, being conservative, believes that the unconstrained view of human nature is the correct view, but he does not offer substantial biological evidence to support his case.

For that, we turn to the magnum opus of evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker: The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Pinker, a chaired professor at Harvard University, challenges the idea that the mind is a blank slate shaped entirely by the environment. He presents encyclopedic evidence from psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience to show that human biology significantly influence human behavior and personality. Far from being a blank slate, human nature is an intricate tapestry woven from millions of years of evolutionary choices.

After establishing the scientific soundness of biological human nature, Pinker turns to issues of politics. Citing Thomas Sowell’s groundbreaking work in A Conflict of Visions, Pinker proceeds to explore two different views of human nature.

What Pinker calls the tragic view is essentially Thomas Sowell's constrained vision. It sees human nature as inherently flawed, marked by selfishness, and limited in its capacity for change. Social structures that ignore, or try to eradicate, these innate tendencies, inevitably fail. Rather than trying to create a perfect society, we should focus on creating systems that mitigate and sublimate our flaws while allowing for the greatest amount of freedom and prosperity. The tragic view emphasizes the importance of tradition, social norms, and institutional checks to manage the darker aspects of human nature. It is the right-wing view of mankind.

What Pinker calls the utopian view is essentially Sowell’s unconstrained vision. It posits that humans are born as blank slates upon which society writes its. Vices such as greed and sloth are in no way inherent to the human condition, but rather the result of corrupting social institutions or environments. By reforming society's structures, utopians aim to can unleash the innate goodness of humanity and achieve a perfect or near-perfect society. The utopian view emphasizes the eradication of institutions seen as oppressive. It is the left-wing view of mankind.

Pinker, a liberal Democrat tenured at an ultra-liberal Ivy League university, ultimately still criticizes the utopian view for ignoring the biological realities of human nature. He argues that such naivety has lead to disastrous social experiments such as communism, which claimed the lives of countless millions.

If Pinker is right, then the dictates of human nature do mean that there are objectively better and objectively worse social structures for human flourishing. The foundation of anthrophysiocracy is established.

Now, to be clear, Pinker is not a bio-essentialist or environmental denier. He admits, as self-evident, that there are cultural differences between various human populations which affect human behavior. What Pinker does not discuss, however, is whether there are biological differences between human populations which create those cultural differences.

For that, we turn to David Reich’s seminal Who We Are and How We Got Here. Reich, like Pinker, is a liberal Harvard professor. His specialty is the population genetics of ancient humans and, like Pinker, he makes an honest attempt to follow his own findings to their logical conclusion. His contribution to our understanding of differences among human populations is enormous.

Nevertheless, it seems that writing Who We Are made Professor Reich very, very uncomfortable. In Chapter 11, The Genomics of Race and Identity, he states:

Through the collaboration of anthropologists and geneticists, a consensus was established that there are no differences among human populations that are large enough to support the concept of “biological race”… This consensus has morphed into an orthodoxy that the biological differences among human populations are so modest that they should in practice be ignored… But whether we like it or not, there is no stopping the genome revolution. The results that it is producing are making it impossible to maintain the orthodoxy established over the last half century, as they are revealing hard evidence of substantial differences across populations.

A few pages later, in the section entitled “Real Biological Differences,” he adds:

I have deep sympathy for the concern that genetic discoveries about differences among populations may be misused to justify racism. But it is precisely because of this sympathy that I am worried that people who deny the possibility of substantial biological differences among populations across a range of traits are digging themselves into an indefensible position, one that will not survive the onslaught of science…

After presenting the evidence of substantial differences, he ultimately refuses to accept the implications of his own work:

The idea that not only are there substantial differences, but that they likely correspond to traditional racial stereotypes, has no merit… If we can be confident of anything, it is that whatever differences we think we perceive, our expectations are most likely wrong. We truly have no idea what the nature or direction of genetically encoded differences among populations will be.

Perhaps out of fear of being socially ostracized for betraying the liberal orthodoxy, Reich spends the last chapter of his book whistling past a graveyard of his own construction.

Far more fearless in his conclusions is Nicholas Wade, author of A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race, and Human History. Whereas Reich asserts that we should assume stereotypes are genetically unfounded until proven otherwise, Wade offers example after example of stereotypes being just that. Among the findings that Wade cites are a 2006 study suggesting that the high average IQ of Ashkenazi Jews might reflect natural selection due to a millennium-long history of practicing the intellectually demanding art of moneylending; . Another claim Wade makes is that people of Sub-Saharan ancestry have less propensity of work than Eurasians because their populations have never gone through the type of natural selection for hard work that Eurasians in the cold northern climates suffered. Wade also approvingly cites A Farewell to Alms for its finding that the Industrial Revolution took off in Britain because wealthy, intelligent people had more children.

Wade eventually reaches the inevitable conclusion - that different human populations create, need, and flourish in, different civilizations:

Each of the major civilizations has developed the institutions appropriate for its circumstances and survival. But these institutions, though heavily imbued with cultural traditions, rest on a bedrock of genetically shaped human behavior. And when a civilization produces a distinctive set of institutions that endures for many generations, that is the sign of a supporting suite of variations in the genes that influence social behavior.

If Wade is correct, then anthrophysiocracy is correct: biological differences between different human populations make some systems good for one group and bad for another, and the globalist agenda of a universalizing world order is doomed to fail. Communism will only work with ants… and neoliberal democracy will only work with Europeans.

So is Wade right? At the time he wrote his book, in 2014, the answer was a definite “maybe.” Reich, writing four years later, actually spends about half of his penultimate chapter arguing against Wade. He seems to see Wade as his bête noire, a sort of arch-enemy to good genomic science. Yet, despite his best efforts, Reich cannot even conclusively say that Wade’s conclusions are wrong. Ultimately all of Reich’s criticism boils down to this single sentence:

Wade highlights work on the basis that it might be right.

Unfortunately for Reich, but fortunately for anthrophysiocracy, subsequent work has largely proven Wade right and Reich wrong. Among these works are Edward Dutton’s Making Sense of Race (202) and Charles Murray’s Human Diversity (2020) as well as Murray’s follow-up, Facing Reality (2021). While Dutton’s politics are hard right, and Charles Murray’s are center left, their three books are largely in agreement. All three books find that there are substantial differences among human populations and that these differences have powerful explanatory value.

You can read Making Sense of Race and Human Diversity in any order, but read Murray’s Facing Reality last. It is a fitting capstone for Murray’s intellectual career, because he ultimately concludes that the worst case suggested by his first book, The Bell Curve, was, in fact, the actual case. It is a book written by a man in despair, a man witnessing the self-destruction of a society that prefers pleasant falsehoods to harsh reality.

Anthrophysiocracy faces that reality. It acknowledges that human nature is not a blank slate, not a malleable putty, that New Soviet Man cannot be built and socialism will never work no matter how many times it’s tried. Utopian schemes for the improvement of the human condition cannot hope to succeed.

But anthrophysiocracy also acknowledges that human nature is not a universal norm. It knows there is not one human nature, but many human natures, each grounded in the biology of its ancestrally distinct human group. Since human nature shapes human organization, there can be no one proper organization for every human population.

Just as some populations fare better or worse with a diet of milk, wheat, or rice, so too do some populations fare better or worse with different social structures. Liberal democracy might work for one group, Christian conservatism for another, and authoritarian stratocracy for a third. Globalist schemes to universalize human government cannot hope to succeed. Diverse people need to be free to self-govern in the diverse ways that suit them best - not because we accept relativistic morality, but because we accept objective biology!

The anthrophysiocratic view is, of course, anathema to our global elite, and few “respectable” thinkers would ever entertain it. Still, part of me wonders, whether in secret, the elite fascination with transhumanism and population mixture are reflective of an implicit acceptance of anthrophysiocracy. Our elites may well believe that, if humans are too selfish by nature for socialist society, and if human nature is too diverse for easy global governance, then the best course of action is to genetically homogenize and domesticate human nature. Such a belief would explain many otherwise inexplicable circumstances in the modern world…

I leave you to contemplate this on the Tree of Woe.